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1 Introduction
A variety of economic and social settings can be described as contests in which
players exert effort to increase their chance of winning a prize. Most of the
literature posits a model in which the prize is exogenously given; classical
contributions to contest theory in which players compete for a fixed prize
include Tullock (1980), Hirshleifer (1989, 1995, 2001), Dixit (1987), and Nti
(1997), among others.
In the fixed prize model, rent-seeking investments represent “the unproductive
use of resources to contest, rather than create wealth” (Congleton et al., 2008).
That is, contestants expend resources to appropriate or defend pre-existing
wealth, rather than to undertake productive activities.
While the fixed prize assumption has been popular and useful due to its analyt-
ical tractability, it does not accurately reflect the strategic interaction in many
common and important settings in which effort can be either productive or de-
structive. Labor tournaments to win a promotion, R&D races to win a patent,
and sports contests are examples of contests in which effort can be productive.
In R&D contests, efforts contribute to higher profits in the event of winning
the patent (see, e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Baik, 1994). In labor tournaments, ef-
forts enhance the profitability of the firm and improve the value of promotion
(see, e.g. Shaffer, 2006). In sports contests, larger efforts increase demand for
or prize from the contest (see, e.g. Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2005).1 Military
conflicts and lawsuits, on the other hand, are contests in which effort can be
destructive. Military combat involves the use of weapons and warfare, causing
destruction of infrastructure and resources (see, e.g. Shaffer, 2006; Chang and
Luo, 2013; Smith et al., 2014; and Sanders and Walia, 2014). Lawsuits to set-
tle industrial disputes or to dissolve partnerships are settings in which parties
often invest in legal representation by expending the very resources they seek
to divide.
In this paper we extend the standard fixed prize model to account for prize
endogeneity. In particular, we study incentives, equilibrium behavior, and out-
comes in contests that combine two features: a prize which depends on aggre-
gate effort, and contestants with different initial strengths – a favorite and
an underdog – who are vying for this variable prize. The interaction of these
features has largely been ignored as the literature has focused either on en-
dogenous value symmetric settings (see, e.g. Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000;
Shaffer, 2006; Chang and Luo, 2013; and Chang and Luo, 2016) or on fixed
value asymmetric contests (Bevia´ and Corcho´n, 2013). Recent advancements in
the endogenous prize symmetric contest literature include contributions which
model contests as endogenous prize all-pay auctions. Baye et al. (2012) assume
1 Broader examples of productive contests from the legal profession, financial markets,
industrial organization, and the entertainment industry are presented in Chung (1996). A
more recent application of an endogenous value contest to advertising is developed in Ridlon
(2016).
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that this endogeneity takes the form of rank-order spillovers and present a
number of contest applications including the dissolution of partnerships, R&D
races, litigation, price competition, job tournaments, auctions with regret, etc.
These all-pay auctions admit multiple symmetric equilibria both in pure and in
mixed strategies. Baye et al. (2012) provide conditions on the payoff functions
under which pure and mixed strategy Nash equilibria exist and provide new
results which can be used to characterize the equilibria of contests featuring
the aforementioned applications.2 In contrast to this literature, we focus here
on Tullock contests rather than on perfectly discriminating ones and show that
these contests have a unique pure strategy equilibrium.
It is known from the endogenous prize contest literature that the departure
from the fixed value assumption changes the incentives of players to exert
effort. In contests with productive effort, there are incentives to expend extra
resources because effort increases the size of the rent, yet these incentives
are limited because each player does not expect to receive the full return of
their own increased effort. Using a symmetric model where prize is concave in
effort, Chung (1996) shows that productive effort contests still generate, from a
welfare perspective, excessively high aggregate efforts. Our approach allows us
draw conclusions regarding the equilibrium winning probabilities and welfare
of the stronger and the weaker player.
As a technical matter, when the prize changes with aggregate effort, the mono-
tonicity properties of the payoff functions of players – including the marginal
gains and losses from exerting effort – are altered in non-trivial ways. Thus,
the extant results on the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the known set of
conditions which ensure uniqueness of equilibrium in asymmetric fixed value
contests (see, e.g. Skaperdas and Gan, 1995; Szidarovszky and Okuguchi, 1997;
Cornes and Hartley, 2003; and Cornes and Hartley, 2012) cannot be applied
to contests with endogenous prizes. For the case in which the contest success
function takes the popular logit form (Tullock, 1980), and the marginal cost
of effort for each player is increasing in the effort level, we show that an equi-
libirum exists and is unique both in productive and destructive contests. Our
general framework captures as special cases the symmetric endogenous prize
models by Chung (1996) and Shaffer (2006) and the standard case of a contest
with a fixed value which we will use as a reference point in our analysis.
Further, we show that in equilibrium the disadvantaged player (the underdog)
exerts more effort, but his probability of winning remains below that of the
player with a head-start (the favorite). A comparative statics exercise allows
us also to demonstrate that an underdog who faces a weaker favorite expends
more effort than an underdog who faces a stronger opponent. These two prop-
erties correspond to the equilibrium behavior that would emerge in fixed value
contests. We also extend the result by Chung (1996) to an asymmetric setting
by showing that in equilibrium total effort exceeds the socially optimal level.
The additional insight that we obtain is that, under fairly general conditions,
2 For a model allowing for multiple prizes and asymmetric payoffs see, e.g. Siegel (2014).
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the deviation from socially optimal behavior (as measured by the difference
between strategic and welfare optimal effort) is greater for the underdog. We
also derive conditions for the endogenous prize function under which, as in the
case of fixed value contests, the underdog imposes a greater welfare loss for
the favorite.
We note that our results are dependent on the particular logit specification of
the contest success function and on our approach to modelling asymmetries.
Standard ways to account for asymmetries are either to assume differences
in players’ (constant) marginal costs (see, e.g. Baik, 1994 or Ridlon, 2016) or
in head-starts (see, e.g. Siegel, 2009). We adopt the latter approach here for
two reasons. First, the head-start assumption is appropriate for modelling the
behavior of contestants who compete by using the same production technology
but have different strengths when they enter into the contest. This scenario
is relevant for applications such as labor tournaments, R&D races, lawsuits
or sports contests. Second, this assumption creates an analytically tractable
environment. It allows for a general representation of the cost function but still
affords equilibrium and comparative statics analysis. A model of a productive
contest with asymmetric, but linear cost functions, is developed by Ridlon
(2016) in the context of advertising campaigns. The constant marginal cost
assumption could lead to equilibrium outcomes in which only one of the players
is advertising (monopoly case) – an equilibrium outcome observed in the case
of strong asymmetries. When players are less asymmetric, they both advertise
whereby the relationship between their advertising expenditures depends on
the level of asymmetry.
Our focus on asymmetric contests allows us to examine how the degree of
competitive balance depends on the fixed or endogenous nature of the contest
prize. Competitive balance is defined as the level of uncertainty in the outcome
of a contest (see, e.g. Owen and King, 2015) and has important implications
in sports economics, military conflicts and labor tournaments. The question of
competitive balance has so far not been addressed in the literature on endoge-
nous value contests because the extant literature has predominantly focused
on symmetric settings (see, e.g. Chung, 1996; and Shaffer, 2006). These set-
tings feature perfectly balanced contests in which all players make the same
choices and win the prize with the same probability. In contrast, we explicitly
account for asymmetries in players’ abilities and compare equilibrium behav-
ior in endogenous versus fixed value contests. We show that, when there is
an asymmetry in head-starts, productive contests generate a higher degree of
competitive balance (more uncertainty in the outcome) than fixed value con-
tests. That is, in productive contests the underdog wins the prize more often
compared to fixed prize contests. Surprisingly, a destructive contest can lead
to a higher or lower degree of competitive balance than a fixed prize contest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model. In Section 3 we discuss the existence, uniqueness, and the properties
of the equilibrium. Welfare results are presented in Section 4. In Section 5 we
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compare productive endogenous value contests with fixed value contests. We
conclude with Section 6. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a contest between two parties labeled 1 and 2. The contestants
have fixed initial (head-start) allocations denoted by ai, i = 1, 2, which can
be viewed as natural or acquired level of strength that players have prior to
the contest. Without loss of generality we assume that player 1 is the stronger
player, that is, a1 ≥ a2 ≥ 0. We refer to player 1 as the “favorite” and to
player 2 as the “underdog” hereinafter. Both players can enhance their odds
of winning by exerting effort, ei ≥ 0, which leads to an overall performance
level of xi = ai + ei. The cost of effort c(ei) is strictly increasing and convex,
i.e. c′(ei) > 0 and c′′(ei) > 0 for ei > 0, and c′(0) = 0.
The effort ei has different interpretation depending on the environment. In
sports, ei can be interpreted as training a player may put forth or some illicit
form of effort manipulation such as performance enhancement via the use of
a drug or financial expenditure in anticipation of game rigging. In military
conflicts, effort might take the form of additional armament and recruitment
in excess of defensive measures in open war. In an R&D race, effort can be
viewed as building of additional capacity in research. In litigation, the extra
effort can be viewed as costly acquisition of additional legal advice or legal
representation, etc. We denote the total performance of the players by z =
x1 + x2.
We assume that the prize depends on total performance, i.e., V (z) > 0 for all
z > 0 and V (0) ≥ 0, and we consider both destructive contests, V ′(z) ≤ 0,
and productive contests, V ′(z) ≥ 0. We further assume that V (z) is weakly
concave, i.e. V ′′(z) ≤ 0 and, for productive contests, limz→∞ V ′(z) = 0. The
probability of winning the contest for any player takes the logit form,
pi (x1, x2) :=
{
xi
z if z > 0,
1
2 if z = 0.
(1)
It is convenient to formulate the strategies in terms of the total performance
of each player xi. For that purpose we express the effort of each player by
ei = xi − ai. Assuming that both players are risk neutral, the payoff of a
player is
Ui (x1, x2) := pi (x1, x2)V (z)− c (xi − ai) . (2)
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3 Equilibrium and comparative statics
With these preliminaries, we state our main result which holds true both for
contests with productive and destructive effort. Let us define the equilibrium
effort of a player by e∗i and his total performance by x
∗
i .
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium) Asymmetric endogenous prize contests have
a unique (interior or corner) Nash equilibrium. In any equilibrium, the under-
dog exerts (weakly) greater effort, e∗2 ≥ e∗1 ≥ 0, but his performance remains
below that of the favorite, x∗2 ≤ x∗1.
We note that while productive contests can have only an interior solution
(see proof in Appendix), destructive contests can have either an interior or a
corner solution depending on the level of relative head-starts of the underdog
and the favorite, a1/a2, and the degree of concavity of V (z).
3 Proposition
1 states that the difference in head-starts that exists prior to the contest
is partially compensated for by the greater effort exerted by the underdog.
However, the strictly increasing marginal cost of effort makes it unprofitable
for the underdog to create a fully balanced contest.4
Related results to Proposition 1 have been developed in the recent literature
on productive contests. Hirai (2012) and Hirai and Szidarovszky (2013) pro-
vide an existence and uniqueness result in a setting with linear costs and
productive effort but do not analyze equilibrium structure. Chung (1996) and
Chowdhury and Sheremata (2011a) provide an equilibrium characterization
for the symmetric case.
We examine next how equilibrium effort and performance change for each
player with changes in the head-start levels of players. All results hereinafter
are stated for the case of an interior equilibrium.5
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics) Equilibrium performance is an in-
creasing function of individual head-start, i.e. ∂x∗i (a1, a2)/∂ai > 0. The under-
dog’s equilibrium performance is a decreasing function of favorite’s head-start
i.e. ∂x∗2 (a1, a2)/∂a1 < 0.
Proposition 2 implies that the performance of the underdog declines with an
increase in the head-start of the favorite. That is, an increased gap in the head-
start levels of the players weakens the incentive of the underdog to compete.
3 See the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix.
4 In a similar head-start model with a fixed prize and constant marginal cost, Froeb and
Kobayashi (1996) show that the head start is completely offset resulting in equal performance
by the players in equilibrium. Such a result would obtain also in our endogenous prize model
under the assumption of constant marginal cost.
5 As indicated earlier, corner equilibria represent a degenerate case applicable for destruc-
tive contests only. The parameter values leading to this case are outlined in the proof of
Proposition 1.
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Unfortunately, there is no clear cut prediction on the direction of the change
in effort of the favorite when the initial allocation of the underdog changes. In
Proposition 2′ (given in the Appendix) we show that when V (z) is linear in
effort, the favorite’s effort increases in the head-start level of the underdog.
4 Welfare analysis
In contests with an exogenous prize, rent seeking expenditures serve the sole
purpose of determining the distribution of rents. In these circumstances, and in
cases in which effort has a destructive effect on prize, effort is socially wasteful.
Chung (1996) argues that in contests with productive effort this result does
not necessarily hold because effort not only increases the probability of win-
ning but also the size of the prize. Restricting attention to a symmetric setting,
he analyzes these additional effects and concludes that, when the prize is a
concave function of total effort, even productive contests are socially waste-
ful. When contestants are asymmetric in their natural abilities, however, it is
known from the fixed value contest literature that they compete less in the
contest (see e.g. Baik, 1994 and Konrad, 2009). As discussed in the previous
section, this equilibrium behavior also applies to the endogenous prize contests
studied here. It is thus a priori unclear whether equilibrium behavior creates
social waste in endogenous prize contests with productive effort. Our asym-
metric setting allows us to explore not only the social efficiency of aggregate
efforts but also the individual effects on efficiency. We first extend Chung’s
(1996) analysis to asymmetric settings. Let us denote the socially efficient
level of effort for each player by xsi and the equilibrium level of effort by x
∗
i .
Proposition 3 (Welfare effects I) In endogenous prize contests, the effort
of each contestant is greater than the social optimum, x∗i > x
s
i . Moreover, the
underdog creates a greater inefficiency, i.e. x∗2 − xs2 > x∗1 − xs1.
Proposition 3 states that in equilibrium there is a misalignment between
marginal and social benefits implying that players create a negative welfare
effect for each other in equilibrium.6 As can easily be observed, extra effort
by one player reduces the welfare of the other player for all effort levels, i.e.,
∂Ui (x1, x2)/∂x−i = xi [V ′(z)− V (z)/z] /z < 0.
To assess these negative welfare effects, we construct a measure that takes into
account both the position and the behavior of players in the contest. Using
the socially optimal effort level xsi as a reference point, we define the negative
welfare effect imposed on player i by his opponent as the difference between
the equilibrium utility and the utility at the socially optimal effort levels, i.e.
Ui (x
∗
1, x
∗
2)− Ui (xs1, xs2). Using this definition, we derive the following result.
6 Our proposition also extends to the corner equilibria in destructive contests except for
e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0, which by definition socially optimal if effort is destructive. See the proof of
Proposition 1.
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Proposition 4 (Welfare effects II) In an asymmetric endogenous prize
contest the welfare effect that the underdog imposes on the favorite is greater
than the effect that the favorite imposes on the underdog when
2 (V (z)/z − V ′ (z)) /z ≥ −V ′′ (z) . (3)
Note that condition (3) is satisfied by some commonly used (endogenous prize)
functions. For instance, it is easy to check that for V (z) := zr, where r < 1,
the condition is satisfied. The underlying reason for this result is that the
underdog exerts more effort in equilibrium thus reducing to a greater extent
the chances of the favorite to win the prize. It is noteworthy, however, that
in productive contests the effort of players also serves to increase the prize,
creating an effect benefiting to a greater extent the favorite as the more likely
winner. Therefore, the favorite sustains a greater harm in equilibrium only
under the stated condition on the endogenous prize function.
As we established that productive contests generate excessively high effort
levels even when players are asymmetric, we study next how the loss of total
welfare depends on the degree of asymmetry between the players.7 We de-
fine the total welfare loss as the combined loss resulting from the inability of
players to coordinate their efforts to achieve an efficient performance level, i.e.
U1 (x
s
1, x
s
2) − U1 (x∗1, x∗2) + U2 (xs1, xs2) − U2 (x∗1, x∗2). For analytical tractabil-
ity, in the current analysis and in the subsequent sections, we specialize to a
quadratic cost function, c (xi − ai) = (xi − ai)2. To measure the level of asym-
metry, we introduce the parameter k ∈ [0, 1] and assume that a1 = (1+k)a/2,
a2 = (1 − k)a/2 where a = a1 + a2 > 0. Thus, the case k = 0 corresponds to
the symmetric game which we use as a benchmark for our analysis. We thus
hold the sum of the aggregate head-start of players constant and equaling to
a and explore how welfare changes when players’ head-starts are asymmetric.
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 (Welfare in symmetric vs asymmetric contests) An
asymmetric contest with a quadratic cost function generates a higher level of
welfare loss compared to its symmetric counterpart.
In the proof (see Appendix) we demonstrate that the efficiency loss in the case
of asymmetric players is not driven by players’ combined level of performance.
Indeed, when the cost is quadratic, the aggregate performance level in Nash
equilibrium, z∗, and in the socially efficient allocation, zs, are invariant to the
level of asymmetry between the players. It is rather the distribution of total
effort across the players that accounts for the inefficiency when asymmetries
are present. This inefficiency arises because the underdog expends too much
effort and the favorite too little effort compared to the symmetric benchmark
which, as we show, leads to a higher total cost of effort provision.
7 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for raising this question.
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5 Endogenous prize vs fixed prize contests: competitive balance
Competitive balance is defined as the level of uncertainty in the outcome of a
contest (Owen and King, 2015) and is predominantly used in sports economics
because sporting events with a higher competitive balance tend to attract more
interest and larger audiences (see, e.g. Forrest and Simmons, 2002; Borland
and Macdonald, 2003). The degree of competitive balance is often taken into
consideration in the design of regulatory policies toward sports leagues (Szy-
manski, 2003). However, competitive balance has also implications for other
forms of contests such as labor tournaments, litigation, and military conflicts.
For example, in military conflicts and international negotiations competitive
balance plays a crucial role in peacekeeping and sustained cooperation, respec-
tively.
In the context of the present model, we study whether endogenous value con-
tests result in a higher or lower degree of competitive balance in comparison to
fixed value contests. Such an analysis would help develop intuition of whether
predictions based on fixed prize models overestimate or underestimate the
competitive balance in endogenous value contests. In particular, we measure
competitive balance as the difference in the winning probabilities of the two
players, (p1 − p2).8 A competitive balance of zero corresponds to a fully bal-
anced contest, and a competitive balance of one represents the polar case of a
fully unbalanced contest in which the winner of the contest can be predicted
with certainty.
To compare endogenous prize with fixed prize contests, we represent the prize
in endogenous prize contests in the form
V (z) = V + g (z) , (4)
where V > 0 is the fixed component of the prize and g (z) is the variable
component of the prize such that g (z) = 0 for z = a1 + a2.
9 For fixed prize
contests we assume g (z) = 0, for productive effort contests we assume g′ (z) >
0, and for destructive effort contests we assume g′ (z) < 0. We also assume
g′′ (z) ≤ 0 for both productive and destructive contests. As indicated, for
simplicity we will work with quadratic cost of effort, c (xi − ai) = (xi − ai)2.10
The first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium of the players i = 1, 2 can be
expressed in terms of winning probabilities and total performance as follows:
∂Ui (x1, x2)
∂xi
= 0⇔ V (z)
z
+ pi
[
V ′ (z)− V (z)
z
]
− c′ (piz − ai) = 0. (5)
8 As player 1 is the more likely winner in our model (see Proposition 1), the competitive
balance is non-negative.
9 Similar structure has been analyzed by Cohen et al. (2008) who look at a contest design
problem in which the designer’s objective is to maximize either the highest effort or total
effort of contestants.
10 Our results holds for any c (ei) such that c
′′′ (ei) = 0.
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Adding the left hand-sides of this equation for the two players, using the condi-
tion p1 + p2 = 1, and rearranging terms, we obtain that the total performance
of the players in equilibrium, z∗, is determined by the equation
V (z)/z + V ′(z) = 2z − 2 (a1 + a2) . (6)
Combining equations (4) and (6) we obtain:
V/z + [g (z)/z + g′ (z)] = 2z − 2 (a1 + a2) . (7)
Let us denote the aggregate effort in equilibrium of a productive contest by zp,
of a fixed prize contest by zf , and of a destructive contest by zd. Note that the
term in the squared brackets is positive in productive effort contests, zero in
fixed value contests, and negative in destructive effort contests. Therefore, from
(7) follows that contestants cut down on their effort in destructive contests and
increase their effort in productive contests compared to the fixed prize case,
i.e. zd < zf < zp.
We turn now to the analysis of winning probabilities. Subtracting the expres-
sion (5) for player 2 from that for player 1, we obtain
(p1 − p2) [V/z + g (z)/z − g′ (z)] = 2 (p2 − p1) z + 2 (a1 − a2) ,
which rearranging results in
(p1 − p2) = 2(a1 − a2)
V/z + g (z)/z − g′ (z) + 2z . (8)
Expression (8) allows us to compare the probabilities of winning of the players
in fixed and endogenous prize contests. Our main result is given as follows.
Proposition 6 (Productive vs fixed prize contests) A productive contest
with a quadratic cost function generates a higher degree of competitive balance
than the corresponding fixed value contest. That is, the underdog is more likely
to win a productive contest than the corresponding fixed prize contest.
We demonstrate that the right hand-side of equation (8) is smaller for pro-
ductive contests. To gain an intuition for the reason why a productive contest
leads to a higher competitive balance, consider a situation in which both play-
ers expand their effort by the same amount. Under the initial asymmetry in
head-starts, and considered Tullock contest success function, this will lead to a
higher degree of competitive balance. As both players have greater incentives
to expand effort in a productive contest (compared to a fixed value contest),
and a unit increase in own effort increases the winning probability of the un-
derdog more than that of the favorite, the underdog has incentives to narrow
the gap in winning probabilities in a productive contest.
Next we turn to the analysis of destructive contests. Our last result demon-
strates that no ultimate ranking can be established for destructive contests
with respect to competitive balance.
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Proposition 7 (Destructive vs fixed prize contests) In a destructive
contest with a prize that diminishes linearly in effort, i.e. V (z) = V + z − z,
the degree of competitive balance is higher than in the corresponding fixed value
contest if and only if the inequality zd < zf − 1/2 holds. That is, the underdog
is more likely to win a destructive contest compared to a fixed value contest
under the stated condition.
Our results show that in contests that are highly destructive, so that players
sufficiently cut down on effort compared to the fixed prize benchmark, the
degree of competitive balance is higher. In these contests the favorite reduces
effort in order to preserve the value of the prize leaving the underdog with
better chances of winning compared to the fixed prize benchmark. Conversely,
in less destructive contests the favorite cuts down on effort to a smaller ex-
tent and ends up with better chances of winning compared to the fixed prize
benchmark.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines strategic behavior in contests in which the size of the prize
is endogenous and depends on the total effort of contestants. Our model allows
for asymmetry in the players’ initial strengths and explores the equilibrium
behavior of the favorite and the underdog. We showed that for the class of
contests based on Tullock’s (1980) classical model, in which the contest success
function has a logit form and the marginal cost of effort is increasing, the
contest has a unique Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, the underdog exerts
more effort but not at a sufficiently high level so as to compensate for his
disadvantage in head-start (Proposition 1).
While some of the properties of fixed value contests extend to endogenous value
contests, others change in an intriguing way. Our comparative statics indicate
that the directional changes in equilibrium efforts in endogenous value contests
with head-starts are similar to the fixed prize benchmark: an underdog facing
a stronger opponent competes less aggressively (Proposition 2). Under an ad-
ditional restriction on the contest value function, we find that a favorite facing
a stronger opponent competes more aggressively (Proposition 2′). Further, as
in fixed prize contests, endogenous prize contests lead to an excessively high
effort from an economic efficiency standpoint even in the case of productive
contests. While both players exert more effort than is socially optimal, the dis-
tortion caused by the underdog is greater (Proposition 3). Further, the harm
that the underdog imposes on the favorite is also greater, although this partic-
ular result holds under a specific condition on the endogenous prize function
(Proposition 4). Compared to symmetric productive contests, we observe that
asymmetric contests lead to a greater welfare loss for the players (Proposition
5). This welfare loss is observed not because players increase aggregate effort,
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but because the underdog exerts too much effort and the favorite too little
effort compared to more efficient symmetric player Nash allocation.
Marked differences between endogenous prize and fixed prize contests exist
with respect to competitive balance. A productive contest generates a higher
degree of competitive balance compared to a fixed prize contest (Proposition
6). That is, in a productive contest the underdog behaves more aggressively
and wins the prize more often compared to a fixed prize contest. This finding
implies that approaches to measure competitive balance relying on the fixed
prize framework with head-starts would tend to underestimate the degree of
competitive balance.
The result regarding the degree of competitive balance in destructive contests
is more nuanced. Destructive contests can have a higher or a lower degree of
competitive balance compared to fixed prize contests (Proposition 7). In very
destructive contests in which players cut down on effort substantially compared
to the fixed prize benchmark, the favorite competes less aggressively in order to
limit the destruction of the prize. The result may be applicable to the analysis
of armed conflict in that it predicts that the weaker party is more likely to
resort to additional armament compared to what would be rational behavior
in a fixed prize contest. Less destructive contests, however, could lead to a
higher effort by the favorite and have a lower degree of competitive balance.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in three steps in which we demonstrate
(I) the existence, (II) the uniqueness, and (III) the stated structure of the
equilibrium.
(I) Existence
We first show that the effort levels of each player that are above a certain
threshold x¯i are strictly dominated. We then restrict the equilibrium analysis
to a game in which players’ strategies are defined over a compact and convex set
[ai, x¯i]. For destructive contests it is straightforward that effort levels exceeding
x¯i where c (x¯i − ai) = V (a1+a2) lead to a negative payoff for each e−i and are
thus strictly dominated by the strategy of zero effort. For productive contests,
the First Order Conditions (FOC) for an interior maximum are given by
∂Ui (x1, x2)
∂xi
=
∂pi (x1, x2)
∂xi
V (z) + pi (x1, x2)V
′ (z)− c′ (xi − ai)
=
x−i
z2
V (z) +
xi
z
V ′ (z)− c′ (xi − ai) = 0. (FOC)
It follows that ∂Ui (x1, x2)/∂xi < V (z)/z + V
′ (z) − c′ (xi − ai). Applying
L’Hospital’s rule we obtain limz→∞ V (z)/z = limz→∞ V ′ (z) = 0. Note that
limxi→∞ c
′ (xi − ai) > 0. Thus, there exists x¯i such that ∂Ui (x1, x2)/∂xi < 0
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for all xi > x¯i and all x−i ≥ a−i. Then, strategies exceeding x¯i are strictly
dominated. Next we show that the payoff functions are concave in the own
performance of players, i.e.,
∂2Ui (x1, x2)
∂x2i
=− 2x−i
z3
V (z) +
2x−i
z2
V ′ (z) +
xi
z
V ′′ (z)− c′′ (xi − ai)
=2x−iΦ(z) + xiΨ(z)− c′′ (xi − ai) < 0, (CONC)
where we simplify notation by Φ(z) =
[
V ′ (z)− V (z)z
]
/z2 < 0, and Ψ(z) =
V ′′ (z) /z < 0 hereinafter. (CONC) holds by the concavity of V (z), i.e. V ′′(z) <
0 and V ′(z) < V (z)/z. Observe that when a1 > 0 we have z = a1 + a2 > 0. In
this case the contest success function presented in (2) and the expected utility
function presented in (3) are continuous and we can apply Glicksberg’s (1952)
and Fan’s (1952) extension of Kakutani’s (1941) fixed point theorem which
guarantees the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with a
compact strategy space and concave payoff functions. When a1 = a2 = 0, the
expected utility function is discontinuous at the origin. In this case, however,
the contest is symmetric and the equilibrium can explicitly be derived. Using
the (FOC) and the condition x∗1 = x
∗
2 = z
∗/2, we obtain the symmetric equilib-
rium aggregate performance z∗ as the solution to V (z)/2z+V ′(z)/2 = c′ (z/2).
Note that this equation has a unique solution as the left hand-side is mono-
tonically decreasing and right hand-side is monotonically increasing in z.
(II) Uniqueness
We denote the winning probability of each player by pi = xi/z.
11 The aggre-
gate effort of each player can be expressed as xi = pi · z. In an interior Nash
equilibrium, the probability shares add to one and the FOCs are satisfied.
Hence, p1, p2, and z satisfy p1 + p2 = 1 and
∂Ui (x1, x2)
∂xi
= Gi(pi, p−i, z) = p−i
V (z)
z
+ piV
′ (z)− c′ (piz − ai) = 0, (9)
as V (z) is concave, V ′ (z) and V (z)/z are decreasing in z. Moreover, the
function −c′ (piz − ai) is also decreasing in z by the convexity of c (·). Using
the relationship p1 + p2 = 1, we rearrange equation (9) as
Gi (pi, z) = V (z)/z + pi [V
′ (z)− V (z)/z]− c′ (piz − ai) = 0. (10)
As V ′ (z) < V (z)/z, Gi (pi, z) is decreasing in both arguments. Let us assume
now that there are (at least) two equilibria with shares for player i given
by p1i and p
2
i where p
1
i > p
2
i . By (10) it follows that z
1 < z2 as Gi (pi, z)
decreases in pi and z. As G−i (p−i, z) is also decreasing in both arguments, it
follows that p1−i > p
2
−i, a contradiction to the condition that in equilibrium
p1i + p
1
−i = p
2
i + p
2
−i = 1. A similar argument shows that the model cannot
have both an interior and a corner solution where equation (10) is satisfied
11 The approach of using the winning probabilities to provide equilibrium existence and
uniqueness results for fixed prize contests was developed by Cornes and Hartley (2005).
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for at least one player with an inequality (i.e. the marginal utility is negative)
thus ensuring that the Nash equilibrium is unique.
(III) Structure
We first note that productive contests cannot have a corner solution, i.e.,
e∗i > 0 for i = 1, 2, as ∂Ui(ai, x−i)/∂xi > 0 for any x−i ≥ a−i and c′(0) = 0.
Restricting attention to interior equilibria, we will show that for a1 > a2 we
have x∗1 > x
∗
2 and e
∗
1 < e
∗
2. Indeed, using (FOC) for both players, we obtain
x∗2
z∗2
V (z∗)+
x∗1
z∗
V ′ (z∗) = c′ (x∗1 − a1) and
x∗1
z∗2
V (z∗)+
x∗2
z∗
V ′ (z∗) = c′ (x∗2 − a2) .
Subtracting the first equation from the second one we obtain
x∗2 − x∗1
z∗
[
V (z∗)
z∗
− V ′ (z∗)
]
= c′ (x∗1 − a1)− c′ (x∗2 − a2) . (11)
As the term in the squared brackets is positive by the concavity of V (z), the
differences x∗2 − x∗1 and c′ (x∗1 − a1) − c′ (x∗2 − a2) must have the same sign.
From c′ (x∗1 − a1) > c′ (x∗2 − a2) it follows that x∗1 − a1 > x∗2 − a2 as c (·) is
convex. Thus, x∗2 − x∗1 < a2 − a1 < 0, a contradiction. The only possibility
remaining is x∗1 − a1 < x∗2 − a2 and x∗1 > x∗2 as stated in the proposition.12
Note that destructive contests (V ′(z) < 0) may have corner equilibria. For
these equilibria we will show that it cannot be the case that the underdog exerts
no effort while the favorite does, i.e., e∗1 > 0 and e
∗
2 = 0 cannot hold true. Pro-
ceeding by contradiction, note that ∂U1(a1, a2)/∂x1 > 0 > ∂U2(a1, a2)/∂x2.
Denoting a = a1 + a2 we obtain
a2
a2
V (a) +
a1
a
V ′(a) > 0 >
a1
a2
V (a) +
a2
a
V ′(a)⇔ a2
a1
> −aV
′(a)
V (a)
>
a1
a2
,
which contradicts a1 ≥ a2. Similar reasoning shows that a corner equilibrium
with e∗i = 0 for i = 1, 2 exists if and only if a1/a2 < −aV ′(a)/V (a), and
a corner equilibrium with e∗1 = 0 and e
∗
2 > 0 exists if and only if a2/a1 <
−aV ′(a)/V (a) < a1/a2.13 For the former case, we obtain that x∗1 ≥ x∗2 as
stated in the proposition. For the latter case assume that x∗1 < x
∗
2. Then using
(FOC),
x∗2
z∗2
V (z∗) +
x∗1
z∗
V ′(z∗) <
x∗1
z∗2
V (z∗) +
x∗2
z∗
V ′(z∗)− c(x∗2 − a2) = 0,
which contradicts x∗1 < x
∗
2 as V (z) ≥ 0 and V ′(z) < 0.

12 Note that in a model with a constant marginal cost the right hand-side of equation
(11) would be zero, from which would follow that the left hand-side must also be zero, i.e.
x∗1 = x
∗
2.
13 Note that −2aV ′(2a)/V (2a) > 1 does not necessarily hold as for any destructive contest
V (0) > 0 is a necessary condition.
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Proof of Proposition 2. The partial derivatives ∂x∗i (a1, a2)/∂ai, and ∂x
∗
−i (a1, a2)/∂ai
are given by the solution to the following system of equations defined by the
total differential of the (FOC) (see, e.g. Chiang and Wainwright (2005), p.
201) resulting in ∂2Ui(x1,x2;ai)∂x2i ∂2Ui(x1,x2;ai)∂xi∂x−i
∂2U−i(x1,x2;ai)
∂xi∂x−i
∂2U−i(x1,x2;ai)
∂x2−i
[ ∂x∗i (a1,a2)∂ai
∂x∗−i(a1,a2)
∂ai
]
=
 −∂2Ui(x1,x2;ai)∂xi∂ai
−∂2U−i(x1,x2;ai)∂x−i∂ai
 . (12)
Denoting the determinant of coefficient matrix in (12) by |J |, and by |Ji|
(|J−i|) the determinant of the matrix whose ith (−ith) column is replaced by
the vector on the right hand side of (12), we obtain by Cramer’s Rule
∂x∗i (a1, a2)
∂ai
=
|Ji|
|J | and
∂x∗−i (a1, a2)
∂ai
=
|J−i|
|J | .
The diagonal elements of matrix J are negative by (CONC). On the other
hand,
∂2Ui (x1, x2; ai)/∂xi∂x−i = (x−i − xi)Φ(z) + xiΨ(z). (13)
Note that using expressions (CONC) and (13),
|J | = ∂
2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂x2i
∂2U−i (x1, x2; a−i)
∂x2−i
− ∂
2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂xi∂x−i
∂2U−i (x1, x2; a−i)
∂xi∂x−i
= Γ (xi, x−i, z) + (xi + x−i)2(Φ2(z) + Φ(z)Ψ(z)) > 0,
where
Γ (xi, x−i, z) =− c′′ (x−i − a−i) (2x−iΦ(z) + Ψ(z))− c′′ (xi − ai) (2xiΦ(z) + Ψ(z))
+ c′′ (x−i − a−i) c′′ (xi − ai) > 0.
For the derivatives on the right hand-side of (12) we obtain
∂2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂xi∂ai
= c′′ (xi − ai) > 0 and ∂
2U−i (x1, x2; a−i)
∂x−i∂ai
= 0.
Hence, as stated in the first part of the proposition ∂x∗i (a1, a2)∂ai > 0.
For the second part of the proposition note that
|Ji| = −∂
2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂x2−i
∂2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂xi∂ai
= −∂
2U−i (x1, x2; ai)
∂x2−i
c′′ (xi − ai) > 0,
and
|J−i| =∂
2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂xi∂x−i
∂2Ui (x1, x2; ai)
∂xi∂ai
= {(xi − x−i)Φ(z) + x−iΨ(z)} c′′ (xi − ai) . (14)
Thus, for the underdog we obtain ∂x∗2 (a1, a2)/∂a1 = |J2|/|J | < 0. This ex-
pression is negative as x∗1 > x
∗
2.
16 Damian S. Damianov et al.

Proposition 2′ (Linear contests) In contests in which V (z) is linear in z,
a favorite who faces a stronger underdog exerts more effort in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2′. From the analysis in Proposition 2 we observe that
the direction of change in the equilibrium effort of the favorite depends on the
sign of the expression ∂x∗1 (a1, a2)/∂a2 = |J1|/|J |.
We have already established that |J | > 0 yet |J1| = (x∗2 − x∗1)Φ(z) + x∗1Ψ(z)
is an expression that entails the equilibrium efforts of players. When V (z) is
linear in z we have V ′′(z) = 0 and Φ(z) ≤ 0. As x∗2 − x∗1 < 0, it follows that
∂x∗1 (a1, a2)/∂a2 > 0.

Proof of Proposition 3. The socially optimal level of effort xsi for each player
for productive contests is determined by the equation
V ′ (zs) = c′ (xsi − ai) . (15)
The (FOC) characterizing the equilibrium, x∗i , and z
∗ require that the marginal
benefit of a player equals the marginal cost of his effort, i.e.,
Bi (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) :=
x∗−i
z∗2
V (z∗) +
x∗i
z∗
V ′ (z∗) = c′ (x∗i − ai) .
It is easy to see that for the equilibrium effort levels the marginal private
benefit of effort of each player exceeds the social marginal benefit. Indeed,
Bi (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) =
x∗−i
z∗
V (z∗)
z∗
+
x∗i
z∗
V ′ (z∗) >
x∗i + x
∗
−i
z∗
V ′ (z∗) = V ′ (z∗) .
As c′ (xi − ai) is increasing in xi it follows that x∗i > xsi .
To prove the second property, observe first that in equilibrium the marginal
private benefit of the underdog exceeds that of the favorite, i.e.,
B2 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2)−B1 (x∗1, x∗2) =
x∗1 − x∗2
z∗
[
V (z∗)
z∗
− V ′ (z∗)
]
> 0.
Therefore, c′(x∗1 − a1) < c′(x∗2 − a2) ⇔ x∗1 − a1 < x∗2 − a2, which implies
x∗1 − x∗2 < a1 − a2. From (15), it follows that c′ (xs1 − a1) = c′ (xs2 − a2) and
hence xs1 − xs2 = a1 − a2. Thus,
x∗1 − x∗2 < xs1 − xs2 ⇔ x∗2 − xs2 > x∗1 − xs1.
For destructive contests, it is clear that the socially optimal level of effort is
xsi = 0 for all i = 1, 2. Thus, in the interior equilibrium, x
∗
i > x
s
i . In the corner
solution e∗2 > e
∗
1 = 0, x
∗
1 = x
s
1 but x
∗
2 > x
s
2, so the underdog still creates greater
inefficiency. Only for the corner solution e∗1 = e
∗
2 = 0, there is no efficiency
loss.
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
Proof of Proposition 4. The underdog imposes a greater welfare effect on
the favorite when U1 (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) − U1 (xs1, xs2) > U2 (x∗1, x∗2) − U2 (xs1, xs2), which
implies
D (x∗1, x
∗
2;x
s
1, x
s
2) :=
x∗1∫
xs1
x∗2∫
xs2
(
∂2U1 (x1, x2)
∂x1∂x2
− ∂
2U2 (x1, x2)
∂x1∂x2
)
dx2dx1 > 0. (16)
Substituting the cross derivative of the utility function from (13) into expres-
sion (16),
D (x∗1, x
∗
2;x
s
1, x
s
2) =
x∗1∫
xs1
x∗2∫
xs2
(x1 − x2) (2Φ(z) + Ψ(z)) dx2dx1.
Note that, because a1 ≥ a2, we have xs1 ≥ xs2 and in equilibrium x∗1 ≥ x∗2. We
divide the area (C) = [xs1, x
∗
1]×[xs2, x∗2] into the areas (A) = [min {x∗2, xs1},max {x∗2, xs1}]×
[min {x∗2, xs1},max {x∗2, xs1}] and (B) = (C)/(A). For the case xs1 < x∗2 these
areas are presented in Figure 1.
Fig. 1 In Area (A) players impose equal welfare effect on each other. In Area (B) the
underdog creates a greater welfare effect for the favorite.
Due to the symmetry of cross derivatives, we have∫∫
A
(x1 − x2) (2Φ(z) + Ψ(z)) dx2dx1 = 0.
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That is, in area (A) the harm that the underdog imposes on the favorite
equals to the harm that the favorite imposes on the underdog. Thus, in area
(A), D (·) = 0 as illustrated in Figure 1. Consequently,
D (x∗1, x
∗
2;x
s
1, x
s
2) =
∫∫
B
(x1 − x2) (2Φ(z) + Ψ(z)) dx2dx1.
Notice that for all (x1, x2) in area (B) illustrated in Figure 1, we have x1 >
x2. Therefore, the sign of D (x
∗
1, x
∗
2;x
s
1, x
s
2) is determined by the sign of the
expression
2Φ(z) + Ψ(z) = 2
V (z)
z2
− 2V
′ (z)
z
+ V ′′ (z) , (17)
which, when positive, implies that the underdog imposes a greater harm on
the favorite.

Proof of Proposition 5. For the assumed quadratic cost function, the equa-
tions (FOC) reduce to
x−iV (z)/z2 + xiV ′ (z) /z = 2 (xi − ai) . (18)
Combining (18) for i = 1, 2 and using the identities z∗ = x∗1 + x
∗
2 and a =
a1 + a2 we obtain that total effort z
∗ in Nash equilibrium satisfies V (z)/z +
V ′ (z) = 2(z−a). Analogously, using equation (15) we obtain that the socially
optimal effort level zs satisfies V ′ (z) = (z − a). Hence, total effort in Nash
equilibrium and in social optimum is independent of the level of asymmetry.
From Proposition 1 we obtain for the case of strict asymmetry (k > 0) that
x∗1 > x
∗
2 and hence x
∗
1 > z/2 and x
∗
2 < z/2. Note that in the case of symmetry
(k = 0) we have x∗1 = x
∗
2 = z/2. From the inequality V (z
∗)/z∗ > V ′ (z∗) and
equation (18) it follows that for k > 0 the inequality
x2(k)V (z)/z
2 + x1(k)V
′ (z) /z > V (z)/2z + V ′ (z) /2
holds. Hence, 2(x∗2(k)− (1− k)a/2) > z − a for k > 0. It follows that x∗2(k)−
(1 − k)a/2 > (z∗ − a)/2 and x∗1(k) − (1 + k)a/2 < (z∗ − a)/2 for k > 0.
From this result and the convexity of c(xi − ai) it follows that c(x∗1 − (1 +
k)a/2) + c(x∗2 − (1 − k)a/2) > 2c(z/2 − a/2). Therefore, for k > 0 we obtain
U1 (x
∗
1(k), x
∗
2(k)) + U2 (x
∗
1(k), x
∗
2(k)) < 2U1 (z/2, z/2). That is, the utility loss
is greater in the case of asymmetric players.

Proof of Proposition 6. Let ∆pf = pf1 −pf2 , denote the competitive balance
(the difference in the winning probability of the favorite and the underdog)
in fixed prize contests. Similarly, let ∆pp = pp1 − pp2 denote the competitive
balance in productive effort contests. We need to show that ∆pf > ∆pp. Using
equation (8), we obtain
∆pf > ∆pp ⇔ (zf − zp)
[
2− V
zfzp
]
<
g (zp)
zp
− g′ (zp) .
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As g (z) is concave, the right hand side of the inequality is positive. Further,
equation (7) implies that for fixed value contests the inequality V/z2f < 2
holds. Since zp > zf it follows that V/zpzf < V/z
2
f < 2. Thus, the left hand
side of the above inequality is negative and the right hand side is positive.

Proof of Proposition 7. Using equations (7) and (8) we obtain that the
competitive balance in a fixed value contest is given by
∆pf = 2
a1 − a2
V/zf + 2zf
,
where V/zf = 2zf − 2 (a1 + a2). In a destructive contest the competitive bal-
ance is given by
∆pd = 2
a1 − a2
V
zd
+ 2zd +
a1+a2
zd
,
where V/zd + (a1 + a2)/zd − 2 = 2zd − 2 (a1 + a2). Hence,
∆pd > ∆pf ⇔ 4zd + 2− 2 (a1 + a2) < 4zf − 2 (a1 + a2)⇔ zd < zf − 1/2.

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